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Abstract
This paper explores the effects of bank lending shocks on export behavior of Spanish 
fi rms. For that purpose, we combine Balance of Payments data on exports at the fi rm-
product-destination level with a matched bank-fi rm dataset incorporating information on the 
universe of corporate loans from 2002 to 2013. Armed with this dataset, we identify bank-
year specifi c credit supply shocks following Amiti and Weinstein (2018) and estimate their 
impact on fi rms’ exports at the product-destination level. According to our estimates, credit 
supply shocks have sizable effects on both the intensive margin (amount exported) and the 
extensive margin of trade (decision to export).
Keywords: credit shocks, exports, fi rm level data.
JEL classifi cation: F10, F30, F40, G15, G21, G32.
Resumen
Este trabajo investiga los efectos de shocks de crédito sobre las exportaciones de las 
empresas españolas. Para ello, combinamos la información procedente de los microdatos 
de transacciones con el exterior de la Balanza de Pagos con datos de crédito procedentes de 
la Central de Información de Riesgos a lo largo del período 2002-2013. A continuación, 
identifi camos shocks de oferta de crédito específcos para cada banco y año siguiendo la 
metodología de Amiti y Weinstein (2018) y estimamos su efecto sobre las ventas exteriores 
de las empresas españolas. Los resultados indican que los shocks de crédito tienen efectos 
signifi cativos tanto sobre el margen intensivo (cantidad exportada) como sobre el margen 
extensivo del comercio (probabilidad de empezar a exportar o dejar de hacerlo).
Palabras clave: crédito, exportaciones, datos a escala de empresa.
Códigos JEL: F10, F30, F40, G15, G21, G32.
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1 Introduction
Bank credit and exports growth are strongly associated (see Figure 1). However, disentangling
causes and consequences from this correlation poses a challenge. Credit supply and demand forces
are determined simultaneously so that observed credit growth is an equilibrium outcome that is
determined in conjunction with the firm’s behavior in export markets. The aim of this paper is
precisely to isolate the impact of the bank lending channel (credit supply) on exports with special
emphasis on the distinction between the intensive and the extensive margins of trade.
Using Spanish administrative data at the firm-product-destination level, our findings suggest that
credit supply shocks affect exports growth in the intensive margin as well as entry and exit decisions.
Crucially, we uncover a differential effect of bank lending shocks on entry: while the estimated effect
is not significant in the case of temporary trade relationships, it is large and significant when looking
at stable relationships (i.e. those lasting at least 2 consecutive years).
Figure 1: Exports and Credit Growth in Spain
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Source: Banco de Espan˜a. Data on credit collected by the Banco de Espan˜a, and captures variation in exporters
aggregate credit. Data on exports belongs to the foreign transactions registry of the Banco de Espan˜a.
From a theoretical viewpoint, financial shocks are expected to distort firms’ export decisions
along both the extensive and the intensive margins. Kohn et al. (2016) show that in a model of
international trade with a borrowing constraint and working capital requirements,1 negative financing
shocks force firms to produce below their optimal scale, thus distorting not only the intensive but
1These requirements are assumed to be larger for foreign sales based on the existence of shipping costs, tariffs and
insurance, and shipment delays.
also the extensive margin by reducing the expected returns from exporting to a particular market.
Alternatively, Bergin et al. (2018) illustrate how lending shocks lead firms to alter their capital
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structure from debt to more expensive equity financing, which implicitly raises the effective cost of
financing the sunk cost of entering new export markets.2
On the empirical front, several studies provide support to these theoretical predictions. Berman
and He´ricourt (2010), and Minetti and Zhu (2011) find evidence that financial shocks affect both
export intensity (intensive margin) and export status (extensive margin) using firm-level data. In
contrast to previous studies, Paravisini et al. (2015) find no effect of financial shocks on the exten-
sive margin of exports during the 2008-09 financial crisis once they account for demand by including
product-destination-time fixed effects in exports regressions. This finding implies that a credit short-
age involves shocks to working capital but not to sunk entry costs at the product-country level, which
somehow contradicts the theoretical predictions in Kohn et al. (2016) and Bergin et al. (2018).
In this paper, we estimate the impact of credit shocks on the intensive and the extensive margins
of trade over the 2002-2013 period in Spain. Following Paravisini et al. (2015), we regress annual
exports growth3 at the firm-product-destination level on arguably exogenous credit shocks at the
firm-year level and a set of product-destination-year fixed effects to account for demand. Intuitively,
identification is based on differences in credit supply shocks across firms exporting the same product
to the same destination in the same year. Also, credit supply shocks are identified as in Amiti and
Weinstein (2018) and Alfaro et al. (2018). According to our estimates, the effects of bank lending
shocks on exports are sizable both in the intensive and the extensive margins. In particular, our
results point to a sizable impact of credit shocks on the probability to leave a product-destination
market but we find no effect on the probability to enter to a product-destination market, in line
with Paravisini et al. (2015). However, when we estimate the impact of bank supply shocks on the
probability to become an exporter or establish a stable trade relationship, we do find a sizable and
significant effect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the dataset combining
Credit Registry information at the bank-firm-year level with Balance of Payments data at the firm-
product-destination-year level. In Section 3 we introduce our empirical specification as well as our
identification strategy for isolating credit supply shocks. Sections 4 and 5 present our estimated
effects of bank lending shocks on trade at the intensive and the extensive margin respectively. Finally,
Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
2Baldwin and Krugman (1989) show that entrance in a foreign market involves fixed costs in terms of learning
about the foreign market, establishing networks and regulatory compliance.
3As we discuss below, we consider different specifications with both exports growth (intensive margin) and en-
try/exit dummies (extensive margin) as dependent variables.
1.1 Related literature
This paper is part of a growing literature linking finance and trade. Berthou (2006) and Manova
(2008) identify the effect of financial development on the selection of domestic firms into exporting
and the level of firm exports using data at the country-sector level and exploiting differences in
financial development across countries and in financial dependence across sectors. They find that
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financially developed countries export more in financially vulnerable sectors because they enter more
markets and sell more in each of them.
Greenaway et al. (2007) study the impact of financial constraints on the exporting status in a
panel of 9,352 UK firms between 1994 and 2003, and find that liquidity shocks increase the probability
of exporting as they make it easier to cover sunk entry costs. Muuˆls (2008) uses a credit score measure
built by a large credit insurance company based mainly on financial statements and industry-specific
variables to estimate the impact of credit constraints on exports for a panel of 9,000 Belgian firms
over the period 1999-2005. He finds that, controlling for firm size and productivity, credit constraints
impact the number of destinations to which a firm exports but not the intensive margin measured as
average exports per destination. Berman and He´ricourt (2010) study the impact of credit constraints
on both the intensive and extensive margins for a panel of 5,000 firms in nine developing countries
between 2000 and 2005. They find a positive and significant effect on entry and a small and positive
effect on the value of exports. Amiti and Weinstein (2011) find that a deterioration in Japanese banks
market-to-book value was associated with a decrease in their borrowers exports in the 1990s. Minetti
and Zhu (2011) exploit survey data on credit constraints from Italian manufacturing firms and find
that the probability of exporting and exports growth are significantly lower for credit constrained
firms. Buono and Formai (2018) find that short run shocks to the supply of bank credit over 1997-
2008 induced Italian exporters to decrease their export flows without affecting their domestic sales.
Paravisini et al. (2015) and Del Prete and Federico (2014) exploit banks’ exposure to the interbank
market during the 2008 global financial crisis to identify a plausibly exogenous bank credit shortage.
Del Prete and Federico (2014) use Italian matched bank-firm data to analyze the effect of trade finance
on exports and find that credit shortages reduce export activity not just via specific constraints on
trade finance but more via a reduction in the availability of ordinary lending. Crucially, Paravisini
et al. (2015) estimate the elasticity of exports to credit for Peruvian firms using customs data
at the product-destination level and Credit Registry information. They identify the effect on the
intensive and the extensive margins and find that credit shocks affect the external sales of a firm
that is already exporting to a given market but do not significantly influence the probability of
entering/exiting to/from a market.
Turning to differences in the trade and finance relationship across good times and bad, Chor and
Manova (2012) and Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017) explore the trade-credit relationship
during different stages of the business cycle for the US by measuring country-specific supply shocks.
Chor and Manova (2012) use import data by country and industry and the interbank interest rates
as a proxy of credit conditions in each country, and find that worse credit conditions decrease exports
of that country to the US and that this effect is larger during the crisis. Niepmann and Schmidt-
Eisenlohr (2017) build country-specific letter-of-credit supply shocks employing a data set of all
trade-finance claims of US banks and find a positive effect on exports which is larger during the
crisis and only present for small countries.
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4In our dataset, the export destination is categorized in terms of the non resident financial institution that is
involved in the transaction. The correlation between exports growth at the country level for the main destination
markets between customs and our database is 80%. Figure A.1 in Appendix A shows the equivalence between balance
of payments and customs data at the country level for Spain’s 9 main partners.
2 Data
We use information from the following data sources:
Balance of Payments data (BP): We exploit a unique administrative database of Spanish ex-
porters for the years 2002 to 2013. This dataset, provided by the Banco de Espan˜a, contains the
micro data information used to construct the official Spanish Balance of Payment Statistics. For
each exporter, we observe the fiscal identifier of the Spanish firm involved in the transaction, the
product code (2-digits Harmonized System Codes — HS ), the country of the foreign client 4 and the
year of the operation (no matter when the payment was performed). Financial entities were legally
obliged to report this information for external transactions above a fixed threshold. Until 2007 all
transactions above 12,500 euros had to be reported and in 2008 the threshold was raised to 50,000
euros. In order to construct a comparable definition of entry/exit, we use an homogenized version of
the dataset including only those transactions above 50,000 for all the years between 2002 and 2013
for the extensive margin regressions.
For the sake of assessing the coverage of our database, we aggregate the transactions at the
annual level and compare resulting micro-aggregated exports with the official Customs data. Figure
2 reveals a high correlation above 95% between both series, which corroborates the good coverage of
our database (for more information see Almunia et al. (2018)).
The dataset comprises trade transactions with 242 partner countries and 119 products at the HS
2-digit level. Figure 3 depicts the number of enterprises, mean exports, average number of products
and destinations traded per firm and total firm-product-destination flows per year for all exporting
firms and for those exporters that have some credit exposure in the banking system.
The number of exporters increased from 26,111 in 2002 to 28,449 in 2008, to sharply fall in 2009
reaching 25,304 firms and then gradually recover until 2013 when 27,490 firms reported transactions
above 50,000 euros. Our subsample with positive credit in those years covers around 90% of exporters
(see top-left graph, figure 3). In terms of the amount exported per firm, we can distinguish three
periods: 2002-2007, characterized by a continued growth of average exports (from 4.27 to 6.24 million
euros), in 2008-2009 they decreased to 6.06 million euros, to then increase in the last period, 2010-
2013, to 8.09 million euros, above the pre-crisis level. For our analysis, we take those firms that have
positive debt, and as we can see in the top-medium graph the average indebted firm exports more
than those without debt during the whole sample period. Our unit of measure to account for fixed
effects is firm-product-destination export flows. The top right graph shows that 95% of flows are
captured with our sample.
The average firm in 2002-2013 exported around 1.67 2-HS digit products and 2 periods can
be defined: before 2008 around 1.62 products were exported per firm and since then around 1.72
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were exported. Similarly, the average firm exports to 2.8 destinations. The below-middle graph
in figure 3 shows that as a consequence of the crisis the number of destinations to which Spanish
enterprises exported decreased, and it increased in 2010-2013, when the average firm exported to
2.85 destinations. Lastly, analyzing the evolution of product-destination markets, we see that they
decreased in 2002-2004 from 3.53 to 3.39, to then increase to 3.61 until 2008. In 2009, average product-
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Sources: Customs and Banco de Espan˜a. We compare the coverage of our resulting dataset with the official publicly
available aggregate data on exports provided by Customs.
destination combinations per firm decreased to 3.53, increasing since then until reaching in 2013 3.72
product-destinations per firm. The average indebted firm exports every year more products to more
destinations, which confirms that credit is positively correlated also with the number of markets in
which a firm operates.
Credit Registry data (CIR): CIR is maintained by the Banco de Espan˜a in its role as primary
banking supervisory agency, and contains detailed monthly information on all outstanding loans over
6,000 euros to non-financial firms granted by all banks operating in Spain since 1984. Given the low
reporting threshold, virtually all firms with outstanding bank debt will appear in the CIR. For each
loan the CIR provides the identity of the parties involved so that we can match the loan-level data
from CIR with administrative data on firm-level characteristics. While CIR data is available at
the monthly frequency, firm-level characteristics are only available on a yearly basis. Therefore, we
collapse the monthly loan-level data to the annual frequency in order to merge both datasets. At the
monthly level, each bank-firm relationship is understood as a loan by aggregating all outstanding
loans from each bank-firm-month pair. Annual bank-firm credit exposure is computed as the average
value of monthly loans between bank b and firm i. We end up with a bank-firm-year database
covering 12 years from 2002 to 2013, 336 banks, and 25,625,695 bank-firm-year pairs (our so-called
loans).
Figure 2: Exports
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Figure 3: Exporters characteristics
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destinations and number of product-destinations for exporters and for our sample of exporters holding a credit.
Transactions below 50,000 euros exluded.
Firms have relationship on average with 2.15 banks per year, 47% of them borrow from more
than one bank and their mean exposure is 1.3 million euros. Exporters borrow from more banks
(around 5.42 per year), a higher share of them is multibank, 82%, and their debt averages around
13 million euros (see Table 1).
Table 1: CIR. Summary statistics
TOTAL EXPORTERS
2003 2006 2009 2012 2003 2006 2009 2012
Firm level
Exposure (MEUR)
Mean 0.85 1.29 1.60 1.57 8.10 11.65 17.01 16.79
sd 19.41 36.94 35.78 35.04 90.65 148.11 194.15 177.58
Median 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.89 1.13 1.30 1.03
N. of banks
Mean 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 4.9 5.2 5.8 5.8
sd 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 4.9 5.1 5.7 5.4
Median 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
% Multibank 45% 46% 48% 51% 81% 82% 84% 83%
Notes. Total: firms with positive debt. Exporters: firms with positive debt and that have exported in the current
year.
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3 Empirical approach
Our strategy to identify the impact of credit supply on exports closely follows Paravisini et al. (2015).
We consider the following econometric model:
ln xipdt = η ln cit + δipd + ζpdt + ipdt (1)
where xipdt denotes foreign sales reported by firm i of product p to destination country d at year t, cit
is the amount of credit granted to firm i, and δipd and ζpdt control for unobserved heterogeneity at the
firm-product-destination and product-destination-year levels, capturing differences across firms and
markets. Specifically, δipd proxies for the firm ability to operate in any product-destination market,
while ζpdt accounts for product-destination-time shocks as, for example, an increase in pharmaceutical
products tariff barriers in South Korea in a given year.
eipdt = ηΔ ln cit + δi + ζpdt + ipdt (3)
5We acknowledge that we do not control for demand heterogeneity within each product-destination market. The
presence of firms that export better quality products within a product category, or sell a product in a different region
of a country, could result in biased estimates to the extent that these patterns might be correlated to bank lending
specialization as in Paravisini et al. (2017).
where eipdt measures the entry/exit of firm i to a product-destination market at time t, cit the amount
of credit received by firm i, δi firm fixed effects and ζpdt product-destination-time shocks. Note that,
In practice, we take first differences in equation (1) to eliminate the firm-product-destination
fixed effects (δipd) and estimate:
Δ ln xipdt = ηΔ ln cit + ωpdt + υipdt (2)
Our regressor of interest, credit, is an equilibrium outcome that depends on both firms’ demand
and banks’ supply of credit, being the determinants of exports of product p to destination d correlated
with credit demand. To isolate the effect of credit supply we instrument actual credit using bank
specific credit supply shocks as estimated in Amiti and Weinstein (2018) — Section 3.1 explains in
detail our strategy to identify credit supply shocks.
Armed with our time-varying credit supply shocks together with the firm-product-destination-
time stratification of the data, our identification assumption is similar to that of Paravisini et al.
(2015). Precisely, we assume that banks credit shocks are not correlated with non-credit factors
that might affect differently exports of a product p to a destination d across two firms. In fact,
the majority of factors explaining export growth are common to all exporters of a product to a
destination. Some of these factors are cost of inputs, exchange rates, and destination and industry
demand.5
In addition, we also explore in Section 5 the effect of credit supply on the probability that a firm
enters/exits a product-destination market using the following linear probability model:
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in contrast with the intensive margin estimation, in this case we account for firm fixed effects instead
of firm-product-destination as most firms only start exporting to a market once.
3.1 Identification of credit supply shocks
To disentangle the bank-lending channel from the firm-borrowing channel, we follow Amiti and
Weinstein (2018) and Alfaro et al. (2018) in estimating bank-year-specific credit supply shocks that
are used as instruments for credit growth in equations (2) and (3). To be more concrete, we exploit
our bank-firm-year dataset in which we observe different banks lending to the same firm and different
6This identification strategy resembles that of the bank lending channel by Khwaja and Mian (2008). However,
instead of considering observed bank supply shocks (e.g. liquidity shocks) we consider unobserved shocks estimated
by means of bank-year-specific effects.
firms borrowing from the same bank. Intuitively, imagine one firm and two banks in year t − 1. If
the credit of the firm grows more between t − 1 and t with the first bank, we assume that this is
because the credit supply of the first bank is larger than that of the second bank. This is so because
demand factors are kept constant given the inclusion of firm-year-specific effects.6
More formally, we decompose credit growth between bank b and firm i in year t as follows:
where cbit refer to the annual average of outstanding credit of firm i with bank b in year t. δbt and
λit can be interpreted as supply and demand shocks, respectively, and δbt captures bank-specific
effects that are identified through differences in credit growth between banks lending to the same
firm. Finally, bit captures other shocks to the bank-firm relationship assumed to be orthogonal to
the bank and firm effects.
Our identification relies on the crucial assumption that firms’ credit demand is the same for all
banks and/or that banks’ credit supply is not firm-specific. A recent contribution by Paravisini et al.
(2017) suggests that this assumption may be violated in the presence of bank specialization to certain
destination markets. However, in our case, there are three points that alleviate this concern. First,
we identify the bank-year supply shocks (δbt) from a sample of non-exporting firms and thus they are
expected to be uncorrelated to the characteristics of exporting firms used in the main equations (2)
and (3). Second, Amiti and Weinstein (2018) show that under these circumstances, i.e. bank supply
shocks arguably exogenous to firm level outcomes, the estimates are expected to be unbiased even
in the presence of bank specialization. Third, Alfaro et al. (2018) show that including bank-firm
covariates as a proxy for bank specialization does not significantly affect the estimated bank supply
shocks.
3.1.1 Plausibility of the estimated supply shocks
In order to assess the plausibility of the δˆbt estimates, we follow Alfaro et al. (2018) and consider
three different validation exercises. For the sake of brevity, we briefly summarize below the main
Δ ln cbit = δbt + λit + bit (4)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1901
conclusions from our validation but we do not report the results since they are virtually identical to
those reported in Alfaro et al. (2018). This is so because we consider exactly the same strategy and
data but excluding exporting firms from the estimation sample.
First, we divide our sample into healthy and weak banks as in Bentolila et al. (2018) and find
that weak banks had higher supply shocks until 2006 and lower afterward, which coincides with the
narrative in Bentolila et al. (2018). We interpret this evolution as clear evidence in favor of the
plausibility of our estimated bank supply shocks. Second, we regress a loan granting dummy on
the estimated bank shocks and a set of firm-year fixed effects to account for demand factors. The
estimated effect of the bank-specific shocks is positive and significant in all years, which indicates
that the same firm applying to two different non-current banks has a higher probability of getting
the loan accepted in the bank with the larger bank dummy.7 Third, based on Amiti and Weinstein
(2018), we explore how well our predicted banks’ credit growth explains the banks’ actual credit
growth by regressing Δ ln cbit on ̂Δ ln cbit = δˆbt + λˆit. The resulting R
2s for different subperiods
are always in the vicinity of 50%, which indicates that the estimated bank- and firm-specific effects
explain a significant fraction of the variation in bank lending.
3.2 Instrumentation strategy
In order to estimate the effect of credit on export behavior from equations (2) and (3), we instrument
credit growth at the firm level (Δ ln cit) with the estimated bank-year-specific shocks (δˆbt). To be
more concrete, we construct credit supply shocks at the firm-year level from the bank-year shocks
identified in Section 3.1. Based on Amiti and Weinstein (2018), we weight the supply shocks of all
banks lending to firm i in period t with the share of firm i credit hold by each bank in the previous
period:
δit =
∑
b
cbi,t−1∑
b cbi,t−1
δˆbt (5)
For instruments to be valid they must be exogenous and relevant. Interestingly enough, δit can
be considered a shift-share instrument in the spirit of Bartik (1991) because it averages a set of bank
shocks with bank-firm specific weights measuring shock exposure. A recent strand of the literature
discusses alternative exclusion restrictions for this type of instruments. For instance, according to
Borusyak et al. (2018), our instrument would be exogenous if bank shocks are uncorrelated with
the average unobserved determinants of exports in the firms most exposed to each bank. Since
bank shocks are identified from a sample of non-exporting firms (see Section 3.1), we argue that this
condition should not be at odds with the data.
Another concern from this strand of the literature is that traditional inference is not appropriate
in the case of shift-share regressions designs. In our setting, the concern is that residuals may be
7Crucially, the firms used in this validation exercise cannot have any credit exposure with the banks in the regression
from which we estimated the bank-year shocks as otherwise they would not be observed in the loan application data.
Therefore, the bank-firm pairs exploited in this exercise are not used in the identification of the bank dummies in (4).
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correlated across firms with similar bank shares. Ada˜o et al. (2018) develop an inferential framework
valid under these circumstances that can be implemented estimating regressions at the bank level as
Notes. This table reports the estimates of the bank lending channel parameter at the firm level estimated from equa-
tion (6). The dependent variable is credit growth (Δ ln cit) and δit is a firm-specific credit supply shock constructed
weighing bank-specific shocks with firm exposure to each of the banks. In addition to the main bank cluster, standard
errors are clustered at the firm level in columns (1) and (2), and multi-clustered at the product and destination level
in columns (3) and (4). *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
8Note also that our instrumental variable is estimated in a first step by linear methods and thus the adjustment
factor for the resulting sampling error resembles the traditional sandwich formula that depends on the variance of
the estimated parameters in the first step (Murphy and Topel (2002)). Since we are using hundreds of thousands of
observations in our first step, we expect the correction factor for the second step to have a negligible effect on our
second-step inferences because the first-step variance is close to zero (see Bai and Ng (2006) for a formal proof of this
argument in a similar context).
discussed in Borusyak et al. (2018). However, our second-stage regressions are at the firm-product-
destination level rather than at the firm level, so it is far from straightforward how to compute the
Ada˜o et al. (2018) standard errors in our setting. Alternatively, we cluster the standard errors at
the level of the main bank (i.e., the bank with the largest value of outstanding loans) which should
alleviate the concern of correlation across firms with similar bank shares.8
Turning to relevance, we provide here evidence that firm-specific credit supply shocks (δit) have
a strong explanatory power for credit growth at the firm level. In particular, we estimate:
Δ ln cit = βδit + it (6)
where Δ ln cit refers to actual credit growth of firm i in year t, and δit is the firm-specific credit
supply shock. Table 2 shows the estimates of equation (6) at the firm-level and at the firm-product-
destination level. The later include all the observations and covariates in our second-stage equation
in (2). The estimated supply shocks (δit) have a positive and significant effect on credit growth in
all columns. Also, the F-statistics above 10 in all cases suggest that our instruments are likely to be
relevant. Note however that the magnitude of the F-statistics is lower when clustering at the main
bank level as expected from the results in Ada˜o et al. (2018).
Table 2: Relevance of the estimated bank shocks as instruments
Firm Level Firm-Product-Destination Level
No Main Bank Cluster Main Bank Cluster No Main Bank Cluster Main Bank Cluster
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δit 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.165*** 0.165***
(s.e.) (0.0099) (0.0243) (0.0073) (0.0078)
# obs 406,896 406,896 883,565 883,565
R2 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.013
F-Statistic 330.5 55.95 509.8 450.1
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9Note that in 2008 the minimum declaration threshold was changed from 12,500 to 50,000 euros, so we exclude
2007-2008 growth from the sample. Results remain unaltered when considering 2008 growth in an homogenized
database including only transactions above 50,000 euros in all years.
10The difference between the OLS and the IV estimate is expected to be larger when the fraction of variation of
credit growth explained by demand is larger. This is so because credit growth can be decomposed in a supply and a
demand component, and one of them (e.g. demand) can be interpreted as a measurement error not correlated with
credit supply. Under these assumptions, the difference between OLS and IV estimates in analogous to the classical
attenuation bias (Arellano, 2003).
4 Intensive margin results
This section discusses the estimates of the effect of the bank lending channel on the intensive margin
of exports growth. In particular, we present the OLS coefficients of equation (2) as well as IV
estimates using δit as an instrument for Δ ln cit. Our baseline estimates are reported in Table 3. The
OLS estimate in column (1) points to an elasticity of 0.117 over the 2002-2013 period.9 However,
when we instrument credit supply in column (2) the coefficient is almost 3 times higher (0.338)
and still statistically significant at the 1% level.10 This implies that a 10 pp. reduction in credit
supply decreases exports growth by 3.38 pp. This effect is not only statistically significant but also
economically relevant in light of the average exports growth of 1.3%.
Due to data limitations, most of the studies previous to Paravisini et al. (2015) assume that
firms and banks are randomly matched by analyzing the effect of credit supply shocks on firm level
exports. In practice, this strategy ignores the product-destination fixed effects in equation (2). Not
accounting for these fixed effects, we are implicitly assuming that on average firms exporting to
better performing product-destination markets are equally exposed to credit supply shocks. We thus
consider a set of naive estimates in which the product-destination fixed effects are not included in
the regression.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 3 present the naive estimation of the elasticity of exports (intensive
margin) to credit without including the product-destination dummies and show that firms and banks
were not randomly matched as the naive estimate for the sample period is significantly lower than
that of the baseline. We thus conclude that the availability of data at the product-destination level
is crucial for properly identifying the effect of credit on exports.
Finally, Appendix B.1 illustrates that our main findings are robust to alternative definitions of
our estimating sample focusing on regular exporters and large product-destinations as well as an
homogeneous version of the database using only transactions above 50,000 euros in all years.
5 Extensive margin results
The extensive margin refers to the evolution of the number of foreign markets (product-destination
combinations) in which firms operate. We consider three different measures: the entry probability
of a firm to a product-destination market, the exit rate and the export status. Specifically, a firm
that starts exporting to a new product-destination market is considered an entry, a firm that leaves
a market, an exit, and a firm reporting positive sales to a product-destination market, an exporter.
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Most papers studying the impact of credit on trade use export status to measure the extensive margin
but thanks to the richness of our dataset we can take into account entry and exit to specific markets.
The exit indicator is well defined because the range of possible exits are those firm-product-
destination-period combinations in which a transaction is recorded. However, when constructing the
entry and export status indicators, the range of potential positive foreign sales is less straightforward
to define. Theoretically, a firm can start exporting any product to any destination, but this is
somehow unrealistic and poses a challenge in terms of the computational burden as the number of
zeros would be intractable. Following Koenig et al. (2010), our baseline definition of entry/export
status assumes that a firm could be present in any product-destination market to which it has ever
exported. Paravisini et al. (2015) assume that a firm can only enter to those 4-digit HS categories
within the set of 2-digit HS industries exported in the previous period. However, we only have
product information at the 2-digit level, so this approach is not feasible in our case.
We argue that the extensive margin is specially interesting because Paravisini et al. (2015) find
no effects of credit supply on the extensive margin for Peruvian exporters during the global financial
crisis. In our setting, we can investigate whether this finding is specifically given by the granularity of
our data or it is more general, even after accounting for product-destination unobserved heterogeneity
as in Paravisini et al. (2015).
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 present the estimates of the effects of bank lending shocks on the
probability to leave a product-destination market. The OLS estimate is -0.04 while the IV estimate
Notes. Dependent variable is export growth. All specifications include a set of product-destination-time dummies.
In the IV regression the change in the log of credit (Δ ln cit) is instrumented with a firm-specific credit supply shock
(δit). Standard errors are multi-clustered at the product, destination and main bank level. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1.
is -0.184, statistically significant at the 1% level and the 5% level respectively. However, in line with
Paravisini et al. (2015), we do not find a significant effect of credit supply shocks on entry or export
status (see Columns 3-6 in Table 4).
Table 3: Credit shocks and exports — Intensive margin
Baseline Naive
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ ln cit 0.117*** 0.338*** 0.214*** 0.115
(s.e.) (0.002) (0.102) (0.004) (0.138)
# obs 828,285 828,285 275,899 275,899
R2 0.014 0.020
Avg. Δ lnxipdt 0.013 0.013 0.022 0.022
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5.1 The crucial role of temporary trade
Our setting allows us to identify whether firms are not encouraged to enter new foreign markets due
to financial shocks or our estimates are driven by the inherent volatility of temporary trade.
On the one hand, Be´ke´s and Murako¨zy (2012) showed that long term exports differ from short
term exports in terms of the sunk costs paid, being in the later distributed across periods and thus
initially lower. In our setting, this implies that we are combining entries which require bank credit
with others that probably involve a reduced sunk cost. In this sense, according to our database
around 50% of Spanish firms’ sales to a product destination are abandoned and only 35% of entries
last more than one year.
In addition, financial shocks might have contrary effects within a firm. Manova and Yu (2016)
showed that financial constraints increase low value added production and decrease the probability
of exporting more profitable products. This adds volatility to our dependent variable because in
response to a negative credit shock a firm could decide to export to a lower value added product-
destination and, in consequence, the reaction of our dependent variable would oppose the findings in
previous papers.
To address these concerns, we consider alternative definitions of the extensive margin of trade.
Table 4: Credit shocks and exports — Extensive Margin
Exit Entry Export Status
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ ln cit -0.0408*** -0.184** 0.009*** 0.0045 0.0107*** 0.0292
(s.e.) (0.0008) (0.0713) (0.0002) (0.0187) (0.0002) (0.0267)
# obs 1,017,408 1,017,408 6,049,176 6,049,176 7,125,842 7,125,842
R2 0.139 0.029 0.058
Avg. eipdt 0.518 0.518 0.0950 0.0950 0.151 0.151
Notes. Dependent variables are exit, entry and export status. All specifications include a set of product-destination-
time and firm dummies. In the IV regression the change in the log of credit (Δ ln cit) is instrumented with a
firm-specific credit supply shock (δit). Standard errors are multi-clustered at the product, destination and main bank
level. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
First, in line with Melitz (2003),11 we estimate the credit effect on the probability to enter a for-
eign market of domestic firms and the probability to stop exporting. Second, we exclude one-off
trade relationships by considering only entry, exit and export status if foreign sales to a specific
product-destination market are reported for at least 2 consecutive years. Although these stable
trade relationships only represent 60% of transactions, they account for 93% of Spanish trade.
11In Melitz (2003) the major cost faced by entrants to new product-destination markets arises from leaving the
home market.
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Table 5: Credit shocks and exports — Extensive Margin. Domestic Producers
Last Exit First Entry
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ ln cit -0.0612*** -0.156** 0.0087*** 0.0828**
(s.e.) (0.0009) (0.0709) (0.0002) (0.0372)
# obs 568,818 568,818 1,942,848 1,942,848
R2 0.574 0.0562
Avg. eipdt 0.157 0.157 0.0629 0.0629
Notes. Dependent variables are last exit and first entry. All specifications include a set of product-destination-time
and firm dummies. In the IV regression the change in the log of credit (Δ ln cit) is instrumented with a firm-specific
credit supply shock (δit). Standard errors are multi-clustered at the product, destination and main bank level. ***
p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
Table 5 shows the effect of bank shocks on the probability of becoming a non exporter (Last
Exit) and the probability of becoming an exporter (First Entry). Specifically, last exit takes a
value of 1 if a firm reported foreign sales in the previous period and leaves the product destination
market not reporting any export in the current period and 0 in case it continues exporting. First
entry is measured using a sample of firms not exporting in the previous period: a firm not having
exported neither in the previous nor in the current period is a 0 and a firm that starts exporting to a
product-destination is a 1. Columns (1) and (2) show that the coefficients in the case of the last exit
measure are -0.0612, significant at the 1% level, and -0.156, significant at the 5% level; estimated
with OLS and IV respectively. Additionally, Columns (3) and (4) in Table 5 show the OLS and IV
estimates of the credit supply shocks on first entry. The estimated effects are statistically significant
and economically relevant if we compare for instance the 0.0828 coefficient in column (4) with the
average first entry rate of 6.3%. These results confirm that credit growth increases the entrance of
firms to foreign markets by making it possible to face the fixed cost of leaving the domestic market.
In addition, credit shocks increase the probability to remain exposed to the foreign market.
The difference between our baseline estimates and those measuring the probability of becoming
an exporter (non-exporter) might be due to temporal trade relationships which involve lower initial
sunk costs and are less dependent on credit. This means that the insignificance of credit supply in
the baseline entry/status regressions might be given by temporary trade relationships with certain
product-destinations. In table 6 we show the impact of credit supply on the probability of exiting a
product-destination market to which the firm had reported positive sales during at least two years,
the probability of entering a product destination market in which the firm remains two years or
more, and the probability of being a stable exporter. Here, we also find a high and significant credit
effect on entry and export status. However, the influence of the bank lending channel on the exit
probability is not significant in this case. Once a firm is stable in a product destination market,
financial shocks might lose importance as firms are able to find additional finance sources.
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Finally, Appendix B.2 confirms that our main findings are robust to alternative definitions of our
estimating sample and an alternative threshold for entry/exit definitions exploiting only transactions
above 100,000 euros.
6 Concluding remarks
In standard models of international trade with borrowing constraints and working capital require-
ments financial shocks are expected to distort firms’ export decisions along both the extensive and
the intensive margins (e.g. Kohn et al. (2016), Bergin et al. (2018)). In contrast to empirical studies
using firm-level data,12 Paravisini et al. (2015) find no effect of financial shocks on the extensive
margin of exports during the 2008-09 financial crisis once they account for demand by including
Notes. Dependent variables are exit, entry and export status. All specifications include a set of product-destination-
time and firm dummies. In the IV regression the change in the log of credit (Δ ln cit) is instrumented with a firm
specific credit supply shock (δit). Standard errors are multi-clustered at the product, destination and main bank
level. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
Table 6: Credit shocks and exports — Extensive Margin. Regular Markets
Exit Entry Export Status
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ ln cit -0.0554*** -0.185 0.0041*** 0.0108* 0.0045*** 0.0389**
(s.e.) (0.0013) (0.155) (0.0001) (0.0063) (0.0001) (0.0189)
# obs 426,637 426,637 5,575,895 5,575,895 7,125,842 7,125,842
R2 0.135 0.013 0.072
Avg. eipdt 0.308 0.308 0.0268 0.0268 0.0911 0.0911
12See Greenaway et al. (2007), Berman and He´ricourt (2010), Minetti and Zhu (2011).
product-destination-time fixed effects in exports regressions.
In this paper, we estimate the impact of credit shocks on the intensive and the extensive margins
of trade over the 2002-2013 period using a sample of Spanish firms with information on exports
at the product-destination level combined with loan level data on credit from the Credit Registry.
In particular, we follow Amiti and Weinstein (2018) in order to isolate credit supply shocks at the
firm-year level and we follow Paravisini et al. (2015) in order to disentangle exports demand and
supply by means of product-destination fixed effects.
According to our estimates, the effects of bank lending shocks on exports growth in the intensive
margin are sizable. Turning to the impact on the extensive margin, we find a large and significant
effect of credit supply shocks on the risk of leaving a product-destination market, as well as on the
probability of a domestic firm to start exporting, and on the entrance to a product-destination in
which the firm remains exporting at least 2 consecutive years. Finally, in line with Paravisini et al.
(2015), we fail to find significant effects on entry in the case of temporary trade relationships.
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A Dataset coverage
Figure A.1: Exports by country
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Sources: Customs and Banco de Espan˜a. We compare the coverage of our resulting dataset by country with the
official publicly available country data on exports provided by Customs.
B Robustness
B.1 Robustness intensive margin
In Table B.1 we conduct additional exercises to explore the robustness of our main findings. In
the first 2 columns, we maintain only those countries to which more than 50 firms export in a
given year. The main estimates remain unchanged. In columns 3-4, we consider only regular firm-
product-destination combinations that are active for 3 years or more in order to avoid the influence
of temporary trade. Our main results are also robust to this check.
Finally, we explore the robustness to the change in the declaration threshold that was raised in
2008 from 12,500 euros to 50,000 euros. In columns 5-6 of Table B.1, we consider a fully homogenized
database including only transactions above 50,000 euros over the whole period. Again, our results
remain virtually unaltered.
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13We are aware of the fact that given the 50,000 euros threshold part of our extensive margin measures are in
fact part of the intensive margin. Restricting the dependent variable to values above 100,000 euros we minimize the
intensive margin component of our estimates.
Exit Entry Export Status Last Exit First Entry
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PANEL A: >50 firms/country
Δ ln cit -0.0410*** -0.188** 0.0091*** 0.0018 0.0108*** 0.0279 -0.0612*** -0.158** 0.0087*** 0.0822**
(s.e.) (0.0008) (0.0720) (0.0002) (0.0190) (0.0002) (0.0273) (0.0009) (0.0719) (0.0003) (0.0370)
# obs 1,007,288 1,007,288 5,879,978 5,879,978 6,937,857 6,937,857 566,292 566,292 1,917,242 1,917,242
R2 0.139 0.029 0.059 0.574 0.057
Avg. eipdt 0.516 0.516 0.0957 0.0957 0.153 0.153 0.157 0.157 0.0632 0.0632
PANEL B: Regular trade
Δ ln cit -0.0496*** -0.251** 0.0195*** 0.0438 0.0202*** 0.202** -0.0428*** -0.110 0.0253*** 0.164**
(s.e.) (0.0011) (0.118) (0.0008) (0.0588) (0.0007) (0.0956) (0.0008) (0.0683) (0.0015) (0.0775)
# obs 578,075 578,075 656,759 656,759 1,256,316 1,256,316 439,511 439,511 134,536 134,536
R2 0.073 0.043 0.087 0.284 0.122
Avg. eipdt 0.269 0.269 0.251 0.251 0.476 0.476 0.050 0.050 0.162 0.162
PANEL C: Restricting the sample
Δ ln cit -0.0459*** -0.202** 0.0066*** -0.0037 0.008*** 0.0268 -0.0546*** -0.167*** 0.00579*** 0.0491**
(s.e.) (0.0010) (0.0975) (0.0001) (0.0128) (0.0002) (0.0226) (0.0009) (0.063) (0.0002) (0.0205)
# obs 674,721 674,721 5,779,579 5,779,579 6,769,436 6,769,436 431,895 431,895 1,877,737 1,877,737
R2 0.153 0.029 0.066 0.52 0.067
Avg. eipdt 0.403 0.403 0.053 0.053 0.106 0.106 0.089 0.089 0.031 0.031
Notes. Dependent variables are exit, entry, export status, last exit and first entry. All specifications include a
set of product-destination-time and firm dummies. In the IV regression the change in the log of credit (Δ ln cit)
is instrumented with a firm-specific credit supply shock (δit). Standard errors are multi-clustered at the product,
destination and main bank level. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
B.2 Robustness extensive margin
Table B.2 presents additional tests to check the robustness of our findings. First, we restrict the
sample to only include those countries to which more than 50 firms export in a given year. The
estimates remain unchanged. Then, we restrict the sample to only include those regular firm-product-
destination combinations that are active for at least 3 years, and again our main conclusions hold.
Lastly, we check whether our results are robust to only taking into account transactions above 100,000
euros for determining our dependent variable.13 In the three panels our results hold.
Table B.1: Credit shocks and exports — Intensive margin. Robustness
>50 firms/country Regular trade Homogenous database
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ ln cit 0.117*** 0.336*** 0.124*** 0.325*** 0.112*** 0.438**
(s.e.) (0.002) (0.103) (0.003) (0.113) (0.004) (0.172)
# obs 826,635 826,635 753,644 753,644 429,255 429,255
R2 0.014 0.015 0.017
Avg. Δ lnxipdt 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.006 0.006
Table B.2: Credit shocks and exports — Extensive margin. Robustness
Notes. Dependent variable is export growth. All specifications include a set of product-destination-time dummies.
In the IV regression the change in the log of credit (Δ ln cit) is instrumented with a firm-specific credit supply shock
(δit). Standard errors are multi-clustered at the product, destination and main bank level. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1.
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